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Introduction
AS THE INTERNET BECOMES increasingly integrated into every-
day life, maintaining control over the portrayal of one’s image be-
comes exceptionally difficult. Speech over the Internet, or
“cyberspeech,”1 enhances the means by which people communicate
with the masses.2 Other advances in technology have created the per-
manence of online activity. For example, search engine sophistication
makes cyberspeech permanent, “divorced from context,” and availa-
ble to all.3 The permanence of an online footprint poses devastating
consequences for those “dogged by the digital scarlet letter.”4 Courts
have largely interpreted § 230 of the Communications Decency Act
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1. Cyberspeech Definition, WIKTIONARY, http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/cyberspeech
(last modified Feb. 17, 2012).
2. See Daniel J. Solove, Speech, Privacy, and Reputation on the Internet, in THE OFFENSIVE
INTERNET 15, 16 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010).
3. Brian Leiter, Cleaning Cyber-Cesspools: Google and Free Speech, in THE OFFENSIVE IN-
TERNET, supra note 2, at 155, 156.
4. Frank Pasquale, Reputation Regulation: Disclosure and the Challenge of Clandestinely
Commensurating Computing, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET, supra note 2, at 107, 110. For exam-
ple, in 2011, evidence suggested that seventy-five percent of human resource recruiters
were required by their companies to research candidates online, and seventy percent of
human resource recruiters reported they rejected candidates because of online informa-
tion. Jennifer Preston, Social Media History Becomes a New Job Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES (July 20,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/21/technology/social-media-history-becomes-a-
new-job-hurdle.html. Additionally, the Internet eases the ability to spread false rumors,
which can result in damaging effects when there are limited, if any, ways to effectively erase
the false information. See Cass R. Sunstein, Believing False Rumors, in THE OFFENSIVE IN-
TERNET, supra note 2, at 91, 93.
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(“CDA”)5 to grant blanket immunity to online intermediaries from
civil liability for content posted by third parties.6 This broad immunity
leaves defamation victims without recourse since third-party posters
often hide under the veil of anonymity.7 The First Amendment8 unde-
niably gives publishers the freedom to speak through various Internet
platforms,9 but this freedom cannot exist in a vacuum. Eventually, the
demand for accountability will increase when those freedoms are
more frequently abused.10 One way to reduce harmful online speech
would be for online norms to shift, perhaps through education, to-
wards discouragement of such speech. That would not likely be
enough, however, because the public seems to have an insatiable ap-
petite for scandal, drama, and gossip, particularly online.11
With the speed of technological progress, statutes regarding tech-
nology quickly become outdated.12 At the same time, judges continu-
ally have to reevaluate precedent to account for new factual and
technological contexts.13 Yet, courts resist judicial reevaluation of
CDA § 230 because the statute lies in the cyberspace domain where
judges “feel most at sea.”14 Cyberspace requires a new understanding
of how law interacts with technology.15 Courts need enhanced train-
ing to play the active role society demands in the contexts of cyber-
space and technology. This Comment argues that judges’ lack of
technological and sociological cyberspace knowhow inhibits them
5. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
6. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
7. Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 117 (2009).
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble . . . .”).
9. See, e.g., About, WORDPRESS, http://wordpress.org/about/ (last visited July 5, 2014)
(“WordPress was born out of a desire for an elegant, well-architectured personal publish-
ing system . . . .”); About, TUMBLR, http://www.tumblr.com/about (last visited July 5, 2014)
(“Tumblr lets you effortlessly share anything.”).
10. Andrew Slitt, Note, The Anonymous Publisher: Defamation on the Internet After Reno v.
American Civil Liberties Union and Zeran v. America Online, 31 CONN. L. REV. 389, 421
(1998).
11. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998); Steven Levy, New
Media’s Dark Star, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 16, 1998, at 78, available at http://www.lehigh.edu/
~jl0d/J366-99/DrudgeNWK.html (providing additional details about the lawsuit and the
rise of gossip journalism).
12. See, e.g., Bryan D. Hull, Recommendation of the UCC Committee of the State Bar of Cali-
fornia: Article 6 Should Be Repealed, 41 ALA. L. REV. 701, 701 (1990).
13. Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the Common Law in Cyberspace, 55
VAND. L. REV. 309, 312 (2002).
14. Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The Case of Intermedi-
ary Liability for Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569, 655 (2001).
15. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 5 (2006).
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from clawing back at CDA § 230 immunity and performing adequate
analysis in other cases involving online intermediaries. As a remedy,
this Comment proposes a Judicial Cyber Education Program to be im-
plemented at the district court level.
Part I discusses the Fourth Circuit’s broad interpretation of CDA
§ 230 immunity in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.16 and argues that other
judges’ apprehension of analyzing cyber-technological issues has led
them to unnecessarily defer to the Fourth Circuit’s decision in those
cases. Part I also provides examples of additional contexts in which
technological misunderstanding has affected court decisions.
Part II presents cases where judges’ enhanced comprehension of
cyberspace and technology has led to decisions that did not simply
defer to nonbinding precedent. These opinions represent the type of
astute analysis that a judge participating in the proposed Judicial
Cyber Education Program could produce when that judge is unafraid
to resolve hard technological questions.
Part III proposes a Judicial Cyber Education Program designed to
enhance judges’ technical and sociological knowledge regarding so-
cial media providers and online intermediary platforms. Part III also
examines the current Patent Pilot Program17 as a prototype for the
Judicial Cyber Education Program. The Patent Pilot Program demon-
strates the feasibility of introducing a judicial program specially de-
signed to benefit a certain segment of complex litigation.
Part IV addresses potential caveats and criticisms of the proposed
Judicial Cyber Education Program. The criticisms discussed are: (1)
judges are capable of self-education and do not require such a pro-
gram; (2) there is a heightened potential for special interest group
manipulation; and (3) the program could increase the risk of a
judge’s reliance on the Judicial Cyber Education Program’s advisory
memoranda. This Comment, nevertheless, concludes that the pro-
posed program is an effective way to ameliorate how district court
judges decide cyberlaw cases.
I. Background
A. Broad Interpretation of Communications Decency Act § 230
Congress enacted CDA § 230 to foster the Internet’s free market
and promote the growth of the Internet and other interactive online
16. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
17. Pub. L. No. 111-349, 124 Stat. 3674 (2011) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 137 note)
(2012)).
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services.18 Section 230 protects Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”)
from liability based on content posted by third-party users and encour-
ages them to make a good-faith effort to monitor and suppress offen-
sive speech.19
Before passage of the CDA, courts initially grappled with interme-
diary liability in the context of online defamation.20 The courts strug-
gled with determining whether, under the common law, a particular
online intermediary was a publisher or distributor.21 Distributors
could be held liable for defamatory statements made by third parties
“only if they knew or had reason to know of the defamatory statement
at issue.”22 Whereas “one who repeats or otherwise republishes a libel
is [considered a publisher and] subject to liability as if he had origi-
nally published it.”23 The level of editorial control an online interme-
diary maintained over its website emerged as the key element in
analyzing the common law publisher verses distributor distinction.24
1. Zeran v. America Online
In 1997, Kenneth Zeran sued America Online (“AOL”), claiming
AOL was negligent for: (1) the unreasonable delay “in removing de-
famatory messages posted by an unidentified third party”; (2)
“refus[ing] to post retractions of those messages”; and (3) “fail[ing] to
screen for similar posts thereafter.”25 On AOL’s bulletin board, an
anonymous poster had impersonated Zeran, offered various merchan-
dise for sale glorifying the devastating Oklahoma City bombing, and
18. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2012).
19. Id. § 230(c)(2)(A) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be held liable on account of—(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict
access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not
such material is constitutionally protected.”).
20. See Cubby v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 142–43 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding
CompuServe not vicariously liable, in part because it maintained no editorial control over
the content of publication); Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94,
1995 WL 323710, at *4–5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (determining that Prodigy was a
publisher because it differentiated itself from other ISPs by marketing that it exercised
editorial control).
21. Karen Alexander Horowitz, When Is § 230 Immunity Lost?: The Transformation from
Website Owner to Information Content Provider, 3 SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 14 (2007), availa-
ble at http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/398/vol3_
no4_art14.pdf.
22. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *3.
23. Id.
24. CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. at 137.
25. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 327–28 (4th Cir. 1997).
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listed Zeran’s name and home telephone number.26 The posting
caused a surge of threatening phone calls to Zeran’s home telephone,
a number he was unable to change because he conducted his business
from home.27
Zeran argued that CDA § 230 immunity did not apply because
AOL had knowledge of the defamatory postings and should be held to
a distributor liability standard not covered under the immunity provi-
sion.28 The court, referring to one of the policy reasons behind § 230,
rejected Zeran’s argument.29 The opinion further discussed the po-
tential harm ISPs could experience if they were held to even distribu-
tor liability.30 Thus, the court concluded distributors must be
considered publishers under defamation law, and protected both
under § 230 immunity.31
2. Zeran: Policy Decision with Incorrect Predictions About the
State of Technology
When Congress enacted the CDA, the Internet was a “medium of
mass communication that [was] still in its infancy.”32 Since § 230 does
not define the word publisher, the only interpretive aid comes from
one of the statute’s stated purposes, which was to overrule Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.’s33 imposition of publisher liabil-
ity.34 Justice Ain’s opinion in Stratton Oakmont relied on a broad defini-
tion of publisher liability derived from the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, but it also distinguished between publisher and distributor lia-
bility.35 In passing CDA § 230 Congress never resolved the argument
of distributor liability. The Zeran court made a policy choice36 based
26. Id. at 329.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 331.
29. Id. at 330–31; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2012).
30. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (stating that if service providers were subject to distributor
liability, they would face potential liability each time they received notice for any statement
made by any party and be faced with “ceaseless choices of suppressing controversial speech
or sustaining prohibitive liability”).
31. Id. at 332.
32. Slitt, supra note 10, at 399 (internal citation omitted).
33. No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
34. H. R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194 (1996); Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *3.
35. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *3 (“[O]ne who repeats or otherwise repub-
lishes a libel is subject to liability as if he had originally published it.”).
36. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (“It would be impossible for service providers to screen
each of their millions of postings for possible problems. Faced with potential liability for
each message republished by their services, interactive computer service providers might
choose to severely restrict the number and type of messages posted.”).
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on its inaccurate predictions about the future state of technology. The
court opined that “[t]he specter of tort liability in an area of such
prolific speech would have an obvious chilling effect.”37 In making
this prediction, the court failed to appreciate the real threat to speech
imposed by online mobs,38 which chill the speech of those unwilling
to subject themselves to potential defamation or harassment.39 Typi-
cally, the risk-averse pressured into self-censorship are those holding
jobs in industries in which reputation is crucial, such as doctors and
lawyers.40 In 1997, when “commercial online services had almost 12
million individual subscribers,”41 not much was known about the ag-
gregative power of the modern day Internet.42 The Zeran court clearly
did not foresee the chilling effect granting blanket immunity to in-
termediaries would have.
The Zeran court also heavily emphasized Congress’s policy deci-
sion to grant widespread immunity for intermediaries: to remove the
disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and fil-
tering technologies.43 The Zeran court incorrectly predicted that re-
moving liability would promote self-regulation by intermediaries and
speed the development of blocking and filtering technologies.44
Though there exists a degree of self-blocking and filtering45 from
37. Id.
38. See Citron, supra note 7, at 63–64 (explaining that on the Internet, a person who is
intolerantly devoted to his own ideals can aggregate his efforts to suppress dissenter speech
by grouping with others to form a conventional hate group).
39. Id. at 66; see also Freiwald, supra note 14, at 598.
40. See Freiwald, supra note 14, at 598.
41. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850–51 (1997).
42. See Citron, supra note 7, at 66–67 (“The Internet’s aggregative character turns
expressions into actions and allows geographically-disparate people to combine their ac-
tions into a powerful force. . . . For example, an online mob’s capacity to manipulate
search engines in order to dominate what prospective employers learn about its victim, by
aggregating hundreds or thousands of individual defamatory postings, may not be grasped
by judges accustomed to a world in which defamers’ messages either reached a mass audi-
ence or were sent specifically to recipients known to the defamer.”).
43. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
44. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) (2012)); see also Peter Bozzo, Tensions Within the
Communications Decency Act: Reconciling Robust Speech with Intermediary Self-Regulation, YALE
J.L. & TECH. BLOG (Mar. 3, 2014), http://web.archive.org/web/20140611124734/http://
yjolt.org/blog/2014/03/03/tensions-within-communications-decency-act-reconciling-ro
bust-speech-intermediary-se (accessed by searching for Yale Journal of Law & Technology
Blog in the Internet Archive index) (“The lesson of the CDA is that outsourcing regulatory
authority to market actors (ISPs) rather than judges does not end the debates underlying
online conduct; it simply allows different actors to resolve those debates.”).
45. See, e.g., Kristen Schweizer, Google Joins Microsoft in U.K. Efforts to Block Child Porn,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-18/google-joins-
microsoft-in-u-k-effort-to-block-child-porn-online.html.
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larger online companies such as Google46 and Yahoo!,47 post-Zeran,
the steady rise of gossip sites, such as TheDirty.com,48 CampusGossip
.com,49 and CollegiateACB.com,50 highlight the lingering effects of
the one-sided self-regulatory deal the Fourth Circuit viewed Congress
as making with all intermediaries.51 The Zeran court should have con-
sidered the potential abuses of a total liability exemption.
3. Judicial Apprehension of Performing Analysis on
Cybertechnological Issues Has Led to the Unnecessary
Deferral to Nonbinding Precedent
Despite its weaknesses, the Zeran decision still serves as the basis
for intermediary liability in the defamation context.52 Since Zeran,
judges, largely due to their own apprehension of analyzing that same
technology themselves, have failed to recognize and correct the deci-
sion’s faulty predictions about technology.
In Blumenthal v. Drudge,53 for example, plaintiff Blumenthal
brought suit against Matt Drudge and AOL for defamation in
Drudge’s online publication, the Drudge Report.54 AOL had contracted
with Drudge to provide weekly the Drudge Report to its subscribers.55
The terms of the contract between AOL and Drudge allowed AOL to
remove any content it deemed to violate its standard terms of service,
or alternatively, to direct Drudge to remove any such violating con-
tent.56 On August 10, 1997, Drudge submitted a story that accused the
White House of covering up plaintiff Blumenthal’s past spousal
46. About, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/intl/en/about/ (last visited July 5,
2014).
47. YAHOO!, http://www.yahoo.com/ (last visited July 5, 2014).
48. THE DIRTY, http://thedirty.com/ (last visited July 5, 2014).
49. CAMPUS GOSSIP, http://campusgossip.tumblr.com/ (last visited July 5, 2014).
50. COLLEGIATE ACB, http://collegiateacb.com/ (last visited July 5, 2014).
51. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Congress en-
acted § 230 to remove the disincentives to self regulation created by the Stratton Oakmont
decision.”).
52. See infra notes 53-73 for specific examples of defamation cases using Zeran as the
basis for determining liability.
53. 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. Dist. 1998).
54. Id. at 46.
55. Id. at 47.
56. Id. at 51.
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abuse.57 Drudge later retracted the story because there was little evi-
dence that the spousal abuse had actually occurred.58
Determining whether AOL could be held liable under CDA
§ 230, the District Court for the District of Colombia quoted the
Fourth Circuit’s Zeran opinion stating, “[s]pecifically, § 230 precludes
courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer service
provider in a publisher’s role. Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold a service
provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s editorial functions—
such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter con-
tent—are barred.”59 The court concluded that “[t]he court in Zeran
has provided a complete answer to plaintiffs’ primary argument.”60
The Blumenthal court failed to provide any independent analysis for
rejecting plaintiff’s argument, and instead, simply deferred to Zeran’s
nonbinding authority.61
It almost seems as though the Blumenthal court did not under-
stand that the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Zeran was not binding pre-
cedent. The court admitted “[i]f it were writing on a clean slate, this
Court would agree with plaintiffs.”62 It expressed the desire to hold
AOL liable because AOL contractually maintained editorial rights
with respect to Drudge’s content, “including the right to require
changes in content and to remove it.”63 The court reasoned that
“AOL is not a passive conduit like the telephone company . . . [and] it
would seem only fair to hold AOL to the liability standards applied to
a publisher or, at least . . . to the liability standards applied to a
distributor.”64
The Blumenthal court seemed not to realize it was indeed writing
on a clean slate and could have delved deeper into the analysis of the
word publisher. By relying on Congress’s intent to overrule only Stratton
Oakmont, the court in Blumenthal could have concluded that Congress
did not immunize providers from distributor liability and examined
AOL’s liability under this standard. Instead of reluctantly following
Zeran, interpreting the statute to retain distributor liability would have
57. Id. at 46.
58. Id. at 48; Michael Godwin, Internet Libel, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 757, 758 (1998)
(“[There was] just one problem with [Drudge’s] story. . . . Blumenthal apparently ha[d]
no history of spousal abuse”).
59. Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 50 (quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,
330 (4th Cir. 1997)).
60. Id. at 51.
61. See id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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been reasonable in light of the statute’s express terms and legislative
history.65
In Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc.,66 the Ninth Circuit also referred to Zeran
in deciding whether CDA § 230 protected an ISP from liability when
the ISP undertook to remove material harmful to the plaintiff but
then failed to do so.67 The plaintiff had filed a negligence claim
against Yahoo!, arguing the company had a duty to remove the harm-
ful material once the company’s Director of Communications assured
her the company would take care of the matter.68 Although the cause
of action was not defamation, the court stated “what matters is not the
name of the cause of action—defamation versus negligence . . . —
what matters is whether the cause of action inherently requires the
court to treat the defendant as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of content
provided by another.”69 The court held that if Yahoo! was found to be
a publisher, CDA § 230(c)(1) unquestionably precluded liability.70
The court referred to Zeran for the types of activities an intermediary
could perform that would turn it into a publisher for purposes of
§ 230.71 And, as in Blumenthal, the Ninth Circuit used Zeran as if it
were binding without conducting its own reasoning to identify the
functions of an online publisher.
Though undiscerning deferral to Zeran is common,72 it is not
binding outside the Fourth Circuit, and other courts should conduct
independent analyses about § 230 issues. Instead, many such courts,
without first conducting their own in depth analysis, have treated
Zeran as though it were binding, thereby leaving the jurisprudence
surrounding § 230 immunity stuck in the ‘90s.73
65. See supra notes 34–35.
66. 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).
67. Id. at 1098.
68. Id. at 1099.
69. Id. at 1101–02.
70. Id. at 1102.
71. Id. (“[A] publisher reviews material submitted for publication, perhaps edits it for
style or technical fluency, and then decides whether to publish it.”).
72. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52–53 (D.D.C. Dist. 1998); Yahoo!,
570 F.3d at 1101-05; Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Co., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980,
986 (10th Cir. 2000); Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1013–17 (Fla. 2001).
73. See, e.g., Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 52–53; Yahoo!, 570 F.3d at 1101-05; Ben Ezra,
Weinstein, and Co., 206 F.3d at 986; Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d at 1013–17.
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B. Courts: Technological Misunderstanding Affects Areas of Law
Outside the CDA § 230 Context
We can currently “build, or architect, or code cyberspace”74 to
protect the values society wishes to promote, and eliminate those it
wishes to disappear.75 Technology is relatively plastic.76 It can be re-
modeled and reworked to do things differently if the law requires.77
To many, it seems that because courts do not fully understand the
technological intricacies of cyberspace, they have not fully realized the
plasticity of technology and that code is not a constant.78 Apart from
defamation courts tend to shy away from conducting meaningful case
analysis in cyberspace areas in which technological and societal back-
drops are rapidly changing.79
1. First Amendment: Courts Fail to Recognize Facebook Likes as
Speech
The First Amendment80 presents difficult issues as technology
and the Internet continuously develop. For example, in Bland v. Rob-
erts,81 the district court’s familiarity with the popular social media in-
termediary, Facebook,82 was critical to properly adjudicating the
case.83 Plaintiffs, former employees of the Hampton’s Sheriff’s office,
filed suit against the resident Sheriff alleging that his termination of
their employment violated their First Amendment rights of freedom
of speech and association.84 Prior to the plaintiffs’ termination, the
Sherriff had been running for reelection.85 Upon noticing the plain-
74. LESSIG, supra note 15, at 6 (italics omitted).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 32.
77. Id.
78. See Barry Dyson Jr., Should Prosecutors and Judges Be Required to Understand Technol-
ogy?, BUYDIG BLOG (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.buydig.com/blog/should-prosecutors-and-
judges-be-required-to-understand-technology/ (stating the effect of all the laws trying to
regulate technology and the “absurdities” that have come about through their application
have caused people “to turn against the laws and to have a greater mistrust for prosecutors,
judges, and legislators”).
79. See infra Parts I.B.1-2 for a discussion on cases in which courts appeared hesitant
to apply the First and Fourth Amendments to text messages and Facebook likes.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
81. 857 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2012).
82. FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com (last visited July 5, 2014).
83. Bland, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 603.
84. Id. at 599.
85. Id. at 601.
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tiffs liked86 the other candidate’s Facebook page, the Sheriff learned of
their opposition to his reelection and fired them.87 The main issue
before the court was whether liking a Facebook page amounted to
constitutionally protected speech.88 The court distinguished prior
cases that recognized comments and posts on Facebook as speech and
rejected treating a Facebook like as constitutionally protected
speech.89 A Facebook like, the court reasoned, is not the kind of “sub-
stantive statement that has previously warranted constitutional protec-
tion [and] [t]he Court will not attempt to infer the actual content of
[the] posts from one click of a button.”90
To active Facebook users, the court’s reasoning should have
seemed strange. Facebook users view liking as an affirmative statement
that indicates: “ ‘I like this thing right here’, and nothing else.”91
Though the word like on a button is not subject to change by any
user, societal perceptions make clear that users attach substantive
meaning to every like they use.92
Bland sheds light on the difficulty of categorizing popular social
media and intermediary platforms in First Amendment terms because
of the blurry lines among various categories of expression.93 As digital
platforms provide new ways to communicate, social dynamics inevita-
bly change.94 The Constitution is living and was designed to accom-
modate change.95 Courts must keep up with culture at large to render
good decisions.
86. Like, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/like (last visited July 5, 2014)
(describing likes as a way to “[g]ive positive feedback and connect with things you care
about”).
87. Bland, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 603.
88. Id. at 603–04.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 604. Though Bland was reversed and remanded it was included in this Com-
ment as an illustration of the difficulties that district courts are having making these deci-
sions. Infra Part B II.
91. Megan Garber, Is a Facebook Like Protected Under the First Amendment? A Court Says
No, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2012/04/is-a-facebook-like-protected-under-the-first-amendment-a-court-says-no/256534/.
92. See id.
93. Id. (quoting Bland, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 604).
94. Id.
95. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 362
(1992). But see Associated Press, Scalia Slams ‘Living Constitution’ Theory, FOX NEWS (Mar.
14, 2005), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2005/03/14/scalia-slams-living-constitution-the
ory/.
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2. Courts Punt on Incorporating New Technology in Fourth
Amendment Analysis
In City of Ontario, California v. Quon,96 a police officer brought suit
against his employer asserting a search through text messages on his
employer-provided pager violated his Fourth Amendment rights.97
The police department claimed it conducted the search for a legiti-
mate employment-related purpose and did not violate plaintiff’s
Fourth Amendment rights.98
Due to ongoing and significant changes in the dynamics of elec-
tronic communications, the Court refused to issue “[a] broad holding
concerning employees’ privacy expectations vis-a`-vis em-
ployer–provided technological equipment.”99 The Court decided the
issue by simply assuming—without officially explaining—that the of-
ficer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages sent
on his pager.100
It is not surprising that the Court avoided updating the Fourth
Amendment for new technology. Several Justices made statements in-
dicating that they had a hard time figuring out how text messaging
works.101 Justice Scalia seemed surprised by the idea of an intermedi-
ary service provider when he asked counsel for the respondents, “You
mean [the text] doesn’t go right to the other thing?”102 Justice Scalia
was not the only one struggling to understand the intricacies of text
messaging. At one point, Chief Justice Roberts also seemed to have
trouble grasping how text messages work.103 He asked what would
happen if multiple text messages were sent to an officer at the same
time, “does the one kind of trump the other, or do they get a busy
signal?”104
The Court decided Quon in 2010, but the case arose out of events
that occurred in 2001 and 2002.105 The Fourth Amendment issues the
Court declined to adjudicate applied, not to text messages of modern
day smart phones, but rather to messages on pagers used almost a
96. 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
97. Id. at 2624–26.
98. Id. at 2624–27.
99. Id. at 2630.
100. Id.
101. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 43–48, City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct.
2619 (2010) (No. 08-1332).
102. Id. at 48.
103. Id. at 43.
104. Id.
105. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2624.
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decade prior to the decision.106 If Quon’s case file, starting at the Dis-
trict Court, included memoranda explaining the technical functions
of text messages and the role of pagers within the operational realities
of the workplace, judges at all court levels could have used the infor-
mation for self-educational purposes. With access to such informative
memoranda, the Justices could have avoided raising embarrassing
questions at oral argument and could have instead had the confi-
dence not to punt when deciding whether to modernize the Fourth
Amendment’s effect on technology.
3. Judicial Code of Ethics Concerns Lead to Minimized Online
Judicial Presence
Age and generational differences are simple ways to explain the
judicial branch’s general lack of technological knowhow. Other less
obvious factors, such as ethical concerns, also perpetuate judicial tech-
nological blindness. Ethical concerns surround social networking sites
because social networking invites a culture of broad information dis-
semination.107 Social networking sites by design are not private, but
rather are intended to increase the public flow of information.108 Pri-
vacy tools located in a site’s profile settings allow users to retain cer-
tain levels of control over the displayed information.109 However,
users are not able to completely control every privacy aspect of infor-
mation once it is posted.110
There is no express rule against judges’ maintaining a presence
on social media sites; yet, every judge must abide by a code of ethics
set by either the State or Federal Government.111 For example, Canon
4A of the California Code of Judicial Ethics states: “A judge shall con-
duct all of the judge’s extrajudicial activities so that they do not (1)
cast reasonable doubt on the judge’s capacity to act impartially; (2)
demean the judicial office; (3) interfere with the proper performance
of judicial duties; or (4) lead to frequent disqualification of the
judge.”112 Use of technology poses unique issues for judges in comply-
106. Id. at 2621-22.
107. See Participatory Culture, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Participatory_cul
ture (last visited July 5, 2014).
108. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 1, 3 (2010), available
at http://www.caljudges.org/files/pdf/Opinion%2066FinalShort.pdf.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Code of Conduct for United States Judges, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
RulesAndPolicies/CodesOfConduct.aspx (last visited July 5, 2014).
112. CALIFORNIA CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 4A (2013).
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ing with these guidelines. For example, if a person posts comments on
a judge’s social media profile and the posts are left exposed, the judge
could seem to sanction the contents of the comments. This risk cre-
ates a burden for participating judges to vigilantly check their social
networking pages to ensure no offensive or controversial posts are
submitted. Another ethical concern arises regarding whom judges
may ethically include in their social media friend circles.113 Friending
former law school classmates or other attorneys could cast doubt on a
judge’s ability to act impartially in cases where a friend is a party.114
Based on these ethical concerns, many judges choose not to par-
ticipate in or create profiles on social media sites. The Conference of
Court Public Information Officers115 provides evidence of judges’ low
participation rates in social media in a nationwide survey designed “to
empirically measure the perceptions of judges and court officials to-
ward new media and the ways that courts are responding to the new
pervasive reality of Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and the hyper-con-
nected culture they have brought.”116 The survey was administered to
15,000 individuals primarily employed in the state courts.117 Six hun-
dred twenty-three participants completed the survey, 45.6 percent of
which were judges.118 The survey indicated only 19 percent of the re-
sponding judges agreed that “judges can use social media profile
sites . . . in their personal lives without compromising ethics.”119 Only
46.1 percent of the total pool of responding judges indicated they
used a social media profile site, and the percentage decreased signifi-
cantly when measuring how many used their social media site on a
regular basis.120
113. See Jacob Gershman, Judge Disqualified over Facebook ‘Friend’ Request, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 27, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/01/27/judge-disqualified-over-facebook-
friend-request/ (describing the disqualification of a circuit court judge presiding over a
divorce proceeding after the judge sent the wife a friend request).
114. See id.
115. About, CONFERENCE OF COURT PUBL. INFO. OFFICERS, http://ccpio.org/about/ (last
visited July 5, 2014).
116. CONFERENCE OF COURT PUB. INFO. OFFICERS, 2012 CCPIO NEW MEDIA SURVEY
(2012), http://ccpio.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/CCOIO-2012-New-Media-Report
FINAL.pdf.
117. Id. at 4 (survey excludes federal judges).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 7.
120. Id. at 16–17 (explaining 25.2 percent of the judges who responded stated their use
of their social media profile was “>Never − 1x/month”).
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Table I: Individual Users (Judges) of Digital Medial by Year
and Percent. CCPIO New Media Survey, 2012
Judge response
USERS
(judicial)
PERCENT
of general
PERCENT
of judicial
131 21.0 46.1
104 14.6 43.7
102 12.6 40.2
INDIVIDUAL USERS OF DIGITAL MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES
General response
USERS
(general)
PERCENT
of general
Social media profile sites
2012 381 61.2
2011 443 62.1
2010 464 57.4
Table II: Response Comparison of Judges to General Public
of Use of Social Media Profile Sites. CCIPO New Media
Survey, 2012.
SOCIAL MEDIA PROFILE SITES
2012: 381 users, 131 of whom are judicial officers
I use social media profile sites:
General response
(percent of 381)
Judge response
(percent of 131)
2012 2011 2010 2012 2011 2010
>Never – 1x/month 19.7 19.4 23.5 25.2 29.8 30.4
Monthly – Weekly 21.5 21.4 24.4 22.1 22.1 25.5
2x/week – Daily 33.6 36.6 35.5 34.4 25.0 30.4
2x/day – Hourly 20.5 20.1 14.9 16.0 22.1 12.7
≥Hourly 4.7 2.5 1.9 2.3 0.9 1.3
The numbers depicting the low judicial presence on social media
sites affirm the ethical concerns. Recognizing the additional burdens
social media participation causes,121 judges cannot be faulted for opt-
ing out. However, due to the commonality between social media and
intermediary-related cases,122 society should expect that judges fully
understand and fairly adjudicate each issue. It is hard to feel confi-
dent that judges understand social media-related concerns when they
do not use the sites. To understand the importance of a site’s features
it is best to use and interact with the site. The next best alternative to
121. Supra note 113.
122. See, e.g., Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 2013); Lane v. Facebook, Inc.,
696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2012); Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Cal.
2011); Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Doe v. MySpace,
Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008); Doe II v. MySpace, Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th 561 (2d Dist.
2009); Goddard v. Google, Inc., No. C 08-2738 JF (PVT), 2008 WL 5245490 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
17, 2008).
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personal interaction is education about the site’s technical aspects
and their interplay with society. Judges who attained a heightened
level of technical understanding have used the knowledge to make
informed decisions.123
II. Increased Technical Knowledge Leads to Informed
Decisions
A. Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com,
L.L.C.124
  Defendant, Roommates.com L.L.C. (“Roommates”), operates a web-
site that matches renters with those who are renting out their spare
rooms.125 In order to use the site’s service, users must create a profile
by answering questions about their gender, sexual preference, and
whether they have children.126 User profiles also contain a space to
include any additional comments.127 Plaintiffs brought suit claiming
that by requiring answers to the listed questions during the registra-
tion process and permitting discriminatory statements in the com-
ments portion of user profile pages, Roommates violated state
discrimination laws and the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”).128 The court
denied Roommates CDA § 230 immunity defense, not only for the
questions asked during user registration but also for its email and
search functions.129 The court held that the discriminatory questions
qualified as content developed by the site, thus Roommates was an
information content provider.130 Also, the court found Roommates’s
involvement in the search feature established that “Roommate’s [sic]
connection to the discriminatory filtering process [was] direct and
palpable . . . [because] Roommates selected the criteria used to hide
listings.”131 The court granted Roommates immunity under CDA
§ 230 only for the additional comments portion of the user profile
pages.132
123. See infra Parts II.A-B (providing examples of cases where increased technical un-
derstanding led judges to make informed decisions).
124. 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
125. Id. at 1161.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1161–64.
129. Id. at 1167.
130. Id. at 1169–70.
131. Id. at 1169.
132. Id. at 1172–74.
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Judge Kozinski’s in-depth analysis in Roommates discussed and
compared other websites’ ordinary search functions and reached an
independent conclusion about what functions qualified as “developed
content.”133 Additionally, the Roommates opinion revisited two prior
holdings by the Ninth Circuit clarifying the scope of § 230 immu-
nity.134 Judge Kozinski did not rely on any of Zeran’s language or treat
Zeran as binding precedent.135 The Roommates decision demonstrated
it is possible to develop original interpretations of § 230 immunity.
B. Case with Improved Analysis Due to Better Judicial Knowledge
Almost a year after the district court’s decision,136 the Fourth Cir-
cuit revisited the First Amendment issue in Bland v. Roberts.137 The
court carefully examined the merits of the plaintiff’s First Amend-
ment claim regarding whether a Facebook like is a substantive state-
ment amounting to protected speech.138 The court stated “[t]o
consider whether this conduct amounted to speech, we must first un-
derstand, as a factual matter, what it means to ‘like’ a Facebook
page.”139 The court then examined what service Facebook provides
and how users interact with the site when they build a profile.140 The
court further analyzed how Facebook operates and what types of infor-
mation a user profile includes. This was done by reviewing statements
from the official Facebook website regarding “What is a Facebook
‘Page,’” “What is a News Feed,” “What does it mean to ‘Like’ some-
133. Id. at 1167 (“Roommate’s [sic] search function differs materially from generic
search engines such as Google, Yahoo! and MSN Live Search.”).
134. Id. at 1170–71. The court clarified Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1033 (9th Cir.
2003), noting that if an editor publishes material that he does not believe was created for
online posting, he has made an affirmative choice to publish, and this decision rises to the
level of being a material contribution not entitled to § 230 immunity. Id. at 1170. Addition-
ally, the court stated that Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir.
2003), correctly held that a dating website intermediary was immune under § 230, but
incorrectly suggested that it could never be liable because the dating profile did not have
any content until a user actively created it. Id. at 1171.
135. Id.
136. Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2012).
137. 730 F.3d 368, 368 (4th Cir. 2013); see also discussion supra Part I.B.1.
138. Bland, 730 F.3d at 384–85.
139. Id. at 385.
140. Id. (“‘Facebook is an online social network where members develop personalized
web profiles to interact and share information with other members.’” (quoting Lane v.
Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2012))). The court explained that every
Facebook user has a profile that consists of items such as the user’s name, photos, brief
biographical information, list of friends with whom the user interacts, and a list of
Facebook pages the user has liked. Id.
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thing,” and “What’s the difference between liking an item a friend
posts and liking a Page.”141
After reviewing the effect of likes on user profiles and the mean-
ing society gives to pressing the thumbs up button, the court concluded
that liking something on Facebook is “an easy way to let someone
know that you enjoy it.”142 The court explained that when plaintiffs
liked the campaign page in question the like: (1) caused an an-
nouncement in the News Feed of the plaintiffs’ friends; (2) added the
name and photo of the campaign page to the plaintiffs’ profile; and
(3) added the plaintiff’s profile photos to the campaign page under
people who have liked the page.143 The court concluded that a like is
a substantive statement and held, “[o]nce one understands the nature
of what [plaintiff] did by liking the Campaign Page, it becomes appar-
ent that his conduct qualifies as speech.”144 The opinion further ex-
plained a Facebook like “is the Internet equivalent of displaying a
political sign in one’s front yard, which the Supreme Court has held is
substantive speech.”145
The Fourth Circuit’s analysis of the First Amendment issue in
Bland differed significantly from the district court’s discussion. The
lower court looked only to two prior cases and distinguished contexts
where courts had found constitutional protection for Facebook
posts.146 The district court had not seriously considered ways in which
likes could amount to protected speech. Furthermore, the district
court had not tried to understand the technical role likes have within
the structure of Facebook or the substantive meaning users attach to
likes.
The Fourth Circuit’s informed and comprehensive opinion em-
bodies the type of decision that could result from courts participation
in the proposed Judicial Cyber Education Program.147 Had the district
court received information under the Judicial Cyber Education Pro-
gram, the court could have avoided the Fourth Circuit’s reversal. That
would further the Judicial Cyber Education Program’s overarching
goal of creating efficiency.148
141. Id.
142. Id. (citation omitted).
143. Id. at 385–86.
144. Id. at 386.
145. Id. (citation omitted).
146. Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599, 603 (E.D. Va. 2012).
147. See discussion infra Part III.B.
148. See id.
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III. A Judicial Cyber Education Program Can Educate Judges
and Enable More Effective and Efficient Decisions
A. Patent Pilot Program as a Prototype
The United States already recognized the need for the enhanced
education of district court judges to aid in patent litigation and, as a
result, established the Patent Pilot Program.149 Courts were becoming
bogged down with technically challenging and time-consuming patent
cases.150 In response, Congress proposed a ten-year program, which
would direct patent cases to interested judges to encourage them to
build an expertise in the field.151 Congress’s idea was that judges who
are more familiar with the intricate nature of patent law would make
more-informed decisions, which would result in faster, cheaper, and
more accurate litigation.152
Not every district court is eligible for the Patent Pilot Program.153
Due to the high costs associated with hiring experts, Congress limited
availability to the top fifteen districts where patent case filings are
most concentrated.154 Eligible districts must have a minimum of ten
judges and at least three who opt to participate in order to receive
funding for the program.155 Congress’s initial legislation authorized
not less than $5 million per fiscal year, allocated among the districts,
to install training programs for participating judges and hire addi-
tional clerks with technical backgrounds.156
To evaluate the effectiveness of the program, the courts must give
Congress periodic reports.157 At least two reports are mandatory: one
approximately five years after implementation and another immedi-
ately following the ten-year pilot.158 The reports must contain infor-
mation and analysis about the program’s success in increasing judicial
expertise in patent law and the adjudicative efficiency of patent
cases.159 The reports must also contain empirical comparisons of the
rates of reversal of designated patent judges with non-designated
149. Pub. L. No. 111-349, 124 Stat. 3674 (2011) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 137 note)
(2012)).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. § 1(b)(2)(A)(i), 124 Stat. at 3675.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. H.R. 628, 111th Cong. § 1(f)(1) (2009).
157. Pub. L. No. 111-349, § 1(e)(2)(A)–(B), 124 Stat. at 3676.
158. Id.
159. Id. § 1(e)(1)(A)–(B), 124 Stat. at 3675.
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judges, and “the period of time elapsed from the date on which a case
is filed to the date on which trial begins or summary judgment is
entered.”160
B. The Judicial Cyber Education Program Design
The Judicial Cyber Education Program would incorporate ele-
ments of the Patent Pilot Program to demonstrate the Judicial Cyber
Education Program’s high degree of feasibility. The program would
be implemented in U.S. District Courts that have high concentrations
of cases involving digital and online intermediaries which would rem-
edy the judges’ lack of knowledge of cyberspace. The goals of this ten-
year program would be to increase efficiency in cyberlaw cases by de-
creasing the reversal rate of district court decisions and to promote
increased judicial participation in cases involving online
intermediaries.
1. Case Selection and Determination
To determine district eligibility, all district courts would conduct
an internal analysis to assess the frequency in which cases regarding
online or digital intermediaries are filed within one calendar year.
The types of cases sought to be included in the district’s count are
those where the plaintiff’s alleged harm stems from interactions with
an online or digital intermediary.
After each district completes its analysis, the Director of the Ad-
ministrative Justice of the United States Courts would designate the
thirty district courts with the largest number of qualifying cases and
assign not less than fifteen to participate in the program. The assigned
courts must cover at least five different judicial circuits. The Judicial
Cyber Education Program would permit a greater number of district
courts to participate than does the Patent Pilot Program.161. Issues in-
volving online and digital intermediaries arise in more legal contexts
than patent issues.162 Although the number of patent suits may be
higher than the number of cases falling under the scope of the Judi-
cial Cyber Education Program, there is a trend of geographic concen-
tration in patent case filings and venue that this Comment does not
160. Id. § 1(e)(1)(C)(i)–(ii), 124 Stat. at 3675.
161. See id. § 1(b)(2)(A)(i), 124 Stat. at 3675.
162. See supra Parts I.A–B (providing examples of cases in the defamation, First Amend-
ment, and Fourth Amendment contexts).
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anticipate occurring for online intermediary related cases.163 Thus, it
is necessary for the program to afford greater participation to affect
more jurisdictions.
2. Advisors and Memoranda
Similar to the Patent Pilot Program, participating districts would
receive an allocated amount of federal funding to hire clerks and
other advisory support staff.164 The advisors would provide memo-
randa to the participating judges for cases falling within the scope of
the program. The memoranda would summarize the state of technical
science165 at issue as well as the state of pertinent social science.166
Copies of the memoranda generated by the assigned clerks would
be given to each party prior to trial and publically disclosed prior to
adjudication. Built-in transparency requirements afford parties to the
suit—as well as any interested third parties167—the opportunity to re-
but or contest information included in the memoranda. Disclosure
serves as a procedural safeguard to ensure that the information in-
cluded in the memoranda is accurate. Upon request, parties would
have the ability to redact information from the memoranda before
publication to avoid disclosure of trade secrets or other potentially
privileged information.168
163. See James C. Pistorino, 2012 Trends in Patent Case Filings and Venue: Eastern District of
Texas Most Popular for Plaintiffs (Again) but 11 Percent Fewer Defendants Named Nationwide,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.uslawwatch.com/2013/02/18/intellectual-
property/2012-trends-patent-case-filings-venue-eastern-district-texas-popular-plaintiffs-11-
percent-defendants-named-nationwide/.
164. Based on the initial Patent Pilot Program’s $5 million proposal, I can speculate
that no more than $8-9 million would be needed to fully effectuate the program. The
estimate is calculated as follows: Patent Pilot Program’s proposed $5 million divided by the
three circuits the program must cover, which results in $1.67 million per circuit. Thus,
$1.67 million per circuit multiplied by the five circuits the Judicial Cyber Education Pro-
gram would cover equals $8.3 million.
165. For example, an instructional summary regarding the particular code used in the
creation of the intermediary’s website, the relevant functional aspects of the site, and the
state of current and potential technical enhancements being developed.
166. For example, an overview or survey conducted regarding the public’s views and
general cultural attitudes toward the intermediary’s website or particular features of the
site, or a summary of the level of integration or influence the website has in its particular
market and the manner in which the website is intended to be used versus actually used.
167. For example, academic professionals, experts, and interest groups.
168. The redaction aspect differs from the Patent Pilot Program. Patents are publically
disclosed inventions and thus would not have a need for such an option. Since the Judicial
Cyber Education Program could encompass a variety of legal disciplines, provisions pro-
tecting trade secret or personal anonymity concerns need to be implemented.
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To ensure the Judicial Cyber Education Program functions as in-
tended, two reports would be given to Congress by each participating
district during the program’s ten-year duration.169 Like the Patent Pi-
lot Program, the first report would be provided five years after the
initial implementation, and the second report at the end of the ten-
year pilot period.170 The reports would include analysis about the ex-
tent to which the program succeeded in developing enhanced judicial
comprehension and ease in managing cyberlaw cases. The reports
would also contain studies measuring the degree to which the pro-
gram has improved the courts’ efficiency by examining reversal rates
from the courts of appeal and the period of time elapsed between the
date a claim is filed to the date on which the case is resolved.171
The Judicial Cyber Education Program is designed to promote
efficiency and enhance judicial cyber-knowledge. Since the proposed
program closely resembles a broadened Patent Pilot Program, Con-
gress should find that implementation and management of this pro-
gram is feasible and advisable.
IV. Potential Criticisms and Caveats of the Program
A. Judges are Capable of Self-Education
Critics of the Judicial Cyber Education Program may argue that
this system is unnecessary because judges are perfectly capable of edu-
cating themselves about digital and online intermediaries. As evi-
denced by Judge Kozinski in Roommates, generalist judges can acquire
the detailed information needed to conduct the type of analysis this
Comment recommends.172 This criticism ignores the fact the majority
of judges decline to engage in self-study due to the intrinsic limita-
tions on a judge’s knowledge base173 and extrinsic restrictions on the
169. See Pub. L. No. 111-349, § 1(e)(2)(A)–(B), 124 Stat. 3674, 3676 (2011).
170. Id.
171. In the event a case does not go to trial but renders a summary judgment, the
efficiency measurement required by the reports would change to reflect the period of time
elapsed between the date a claim is filed and the date on which summary judgment is
granted.
172. See supra Part II.A.
173. LeRoy L. Kondo, Untangling the Tangled Web: Federal Court Reform Through Specializa-
tion for Internet Law and Other High Technology Cases, 6 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 40 (2002),
http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2002/01_020309_kondo.pdf.
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time needed to acquire such knowledge.174 Self-study does not pro-
mote effective decision making in the most efficient manner.175
Even with intensive self-study, judges may be unable to identify
technological nuances in the make-up of a particular online interme-
diary or fully appreciate its role in modern society.176 As discussed in
Part I, judges tend to avoid participating on social media platforms
due to ethical concerns.177
Judges participating in the Judicial Cyber Education Program
would have advisors dedicated to informing them on matters relevant
to their cyberlaw cases. Informative guidance guarantees that time is
not wasted by having generalist judges engage in self-study. Instead of
identifying superficial and suboptimal information, such judges would
benefit from the in-depth insights of experts.
B. Potential for Special Interest Group Manipulation
Critics of specialist judges or courts assert that such specialization
may open the door for political lobbying or interest group manipula-
tion.178 This argument presupposes that interest groups have agendas
that are “contrary to the societal interests of the general public,” and
that they have the ability to significantly influence the judicial sys-
tem.179 Whether that is true, there is no reason to believe that special-
ized judges or courts will succumb to political pressures more than the
Supreme Court has in the past.180
Under the Judicial Cyber Education Program, expert advisors
would be hired to be neutral third parties and provide detailed infor-
mation reflecting a balanced outlook. Experts spend years educating
themselves and acquiring knowledge. It seems unlikely that interest
groups would alter such thoroughly educated perspectives. Addition-
ally, even if interest groups influence the expert advisors such that the
174. See id. at 41.
175. See id. at 40 (“It is difficult to imagine that generalist judges, even through inten-
sive self-study, may, in a short period of weeks or months, obtain sufficient knowledge of
highly specialized areas of high technology to comprehend the finer nuances of these com-
plex fields.”).
176. Id.
177. See supra Part I.B.3.
178. Kondo, supra note 173, at 38.
179. Id.
180. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 61, 104 (1995)
(stating that Democratic and Republican Supreme Court appointees have different ideo-
logical concerns based upon each respective party’s social agenda). “[T]he ideological bat-
tles between interest groups will not differ dramatically in the generalist arena from the
more honed battles over specialized tribunals.” Id.
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memoranda reflect one-sided or incomplete information, the Judicial
Cyber Education Program’s transparency requirements would serve as
procedural checks.181
C. Judicial Reliance on Clerks and Consultants
Potential problems could arise if judges assume the advisors’ as-
sertions in the Judicial Cyber Education Program’s memoranda are
unquestionably correct. The harm would manifest in a judge’s unfair
reliance on the report’s information and failure to give proper weight
to the parties’ papers or oral arguments. Overreliance could result in
judges not actually gaining additional understanding of the cyber-
space issues.182 This notion undermines a foundational goal of the
Judicial Cyber Education Program—to increase judicial knowledge re-
garding digital and online intermediaries.183 Thus, judges must main-
tain the ability to receive information from their advisors without
being unduly influenced or becoming reliant on the memoranda.
The overreliance risk can be mitigated by the public availability of
court documents and opinions, as well as the public disclosure of the
advisor’s memoranda. If the memoranda unfairly or incorrectly por-
trayed an aspect of an intermediary’s technology or a particular socie-
tal view, transparency enables challenges to be brought to the
attention of the court.184
Conclusion
Professor Lawrence Lessig,185 founder of Stanford Center for In-
ternet and Society, observed, “we are far from a time when our gov-
ernment in particular can properly regulate in this [cyberspace]
context.”186 Unnecessary deferral by courts to Zeran’s 1997 decision in
CDA § 230 cases, reluctance to account for changing societal norms
regarding First Amendment protected speech in Bland, and the un-
willingness to opine on Fourth Amendment analysis as seen in Quon,
all support Lessig’s statement.187 Failure to produce educated deci-
sions about cyberspace issues has led many people to lose faith in the
181. See supra Part III.B.2.
182. See Sheldon L. Trubatch, Informed Judicial Decision Making: A Suggestion for a Judicial
Office for Understanding Science and Technology, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 255, 264 (1985).
183. See supra Part III.B.
184. See supra Part III.B.2.
185. Lawrence Lessig, HARVARD L. SCH., http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/
10519/Lessig (last visited July 5, 2014).
186. LESSIG, supra note 15, at 27.
187. See supra Parts I.A.3, I.B.1–2.
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ability of the judicial system to properly serve its function in modern
society.188 Many “Internet exceptionalists”189 and others yearn for
judges to “take the time and effort to learn about the technology they
see fit to regulate.”190
The Judicial Cyber Education Program would address the lack of
technical judicial knowledge by focusing on cases involving online
and digital intermediaries at the district court level. The memoranda
provided by the advisors in the program would give judges the back-
ground information necessary to help adjudicate complex cyberspace
issues. The Patent Pilot Program shows that Congress has recognized
the need for a specialized program in another context, which should
increase the likelihood of legislative passage. Complexities involving
online and digital intermediaries persist, and with the Patent Pilot
Program as a model, the Judicial Cyber Education Program should be
viewed as a positive approach. Once implemented, judges would no
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